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INTRODUCTION/SUMMARY

On May 9, 1979, Speaker McCarthy created the Assembly
Committee on Fuel Scarcity to examine shortages of refined
petroleum products which had begun to disrupt the social and
economic well being of Californians.

In announcing the creation

of this special legislative committee, the Speaker explained:
"Millions of Californians are confused
and angry. They are victims of a
chaotic fuel supply situation they do
not understand ... (and) they are entitled
to answers ... "
This report summarizes the Committee's efforts, as of
July 1979, to fulfill this charge.
An exhaustive analysis by the Committee of all aspects
of the fuel scarcity situation proved infeasible.

The complexity

of this problem has resulted in an ever-increasing web of related issues for the Committee to consider.

Events of a global,

national, regional, state and facility-by-facility nature are
involved.

The Committee's staff therefore approached the in-

vestigation by focusing on three fundamental areas of inquiry:
1)

crude oil supplies;

formance; and 3)

2)

refinery capabilities and per-

demand for gasoline.

Staff focused on these three areas, rather than others,
after a preliminary analysis indicated that they include the
basic aspects of the fuel scarcity subject which are unique to
California.

Several important factors not treated herein in-

elude the intricate and ever-changing federal allocation and
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price control programs, the state's utilization of its "set
aside" in the federal allocation program, the Governor's oddeven program, competing intrastate demands between farmers and
truckers for diesel fuel which emerged in late June, and the
number of retail service station closings in California.
In spite of this focused approach, there are still
many questions which remain unanswered and no single cause or
factor completely explains why California has experienced a
fuel scarcity.

It is unlikely that any one explanation will

ever satisfactorily answer the question "What went wrong?" for
those who have had to sit in gasoline lines.
Mr. Charles Warren, the Special Emissary of the
President to California on fuel issues, indicated in testimony
to the Committee that the shortfall of allocated gasoline in
California had reached 70,000 b/d in May, 1979, when compared
to May 1978.

This figure excludes 1979 gasoline demand in excess

of 1978 levels.

As it is difficult at best to estimate what

that additional increment of demand actually was (distinguishing
tank-topping, industrial stockpiling, and general panic buying
from natural increases in consumption), the true extent of the
California shortage is unknown.
However, the Committee investigation has resulted in
the isolation of significant trends which contributed to the
overall fuel scarcity problem.

Aspects of crude oil supplies,

refining and demand, all appeared to have had an effect upon
the overall situation.
Trends the Committee has identified include:

1-2

0

CRUDE OIL SUPPLIES.

First quarter 1979

California crude oil supplies remained
at levels similar to those at the end of
1978.

Imports of foreign crude oil into

California for the first quarter of 1979
actually increased over year-end 1978
levels.

•

The Iranian crisis therefore did

not result in reduced imports into California during the first quarter of 1979.
On the national level, 1979 imports and

'

domestic production have declined from
1978 year-end levels.

While the reduction

in imports appears to be a consequence of
the Iranian revolution's impact on the world
crude oil market, the drop in domestic production is unexplained.

In addition, crude

oil stocks which were drawn down substantially
in 1978 have been increasing since the beginning of 1979.
0

REFINING.

In 1979 United States refineries

have been utilized at rates below 1978 yearend levels.

West Coast refining capacity,

of which California refineries comprise 80%,
has

operated at monthly utilization rates

1-3

ranging between 81 and 85% during 1979.
California gasoline production dropped 21%
between December 1978 and March 1979, while
residual fuel oil production increased.
Gasoline inventories were more heavily utilized in this period, but it does not appear
that minimum operating levels were reached
on an industry-wide basis.
Heavy crude oil, thought by some to have
only recently arrived on the California
market, has long been used by California
refineries.

Since the completion of the Trans-

Alaskan Pipeline, in the summer of 1977, heavy
crude oil has comprised a major portion of
California refinery inputs.

Though great un-

certainty is voiced by industry representatives
about the ability of California refineries to
process heavy crude oil, several large California
refineries are relying predominately on heavy
crude oils for their refinery feedstocks.
Federal price and State environmental regulations
have been represented as major obstacles preventing the industry from modifying refineries to
more efficiently utilize heavy crude oils.

How-

ever, a number of California refiners, particularly
smaller independent companies, have begun to modify
and expand their facilities to allow for more
efficient utilization of heavy crude oils.

0

DEMAND FOR REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS.
Purchases of gasoline by the ultimate
consumer are not recorded or compiled by
any central organization.

Demand is evalu-

ated by measurements of taxable distributions, i.e., the tax per volume of refined
petroleum products transferred from the
refinery to the first purchaser in the
distribution system.

While the recorded

distributions for January and February 1979
were unusually high, distributions for
March and April declined significantly to
levels .6, and .3 percent above 1978 levels.
May 1979 distributions were 2.8% less than
those in May 1978.
Growth in the California economy, population,
registered vehicles, and outstanding drivers'
licenses at rates in excess of national levels
could easily account for the increased distributions in March and April.

In addition,

there are indications that commercial purchasers (vehicle fleet operators) took notice
of the Iranian situation earlier than other
consumers and increased the frequency and
quantity of their fuel purchases, which could
account for a significant portion of the increased distributions in January and February.

1-5

Of great significance to an understanding
of the fuel scarcity is the fact that
California is the major gasoline supplier
for much of PADD 5.

Increases in gasoline

exports to other states, combined with reduced imports into California from the
Gulf Coast, further aggravated the California
fuel scarcity.

1-6

II.

o

CRUDE OIL SUPPLIES

Total California crude oil receipts
through March 1979 remained relatively
constant.

Foreign crude oil receipts

actually increased slightly during the

•

same period.
0

1979 United States crude oil imports
and production declined from 1978 yearend levels.
--imports of Iranian crude oil
have been reduced
--existing contracts for imports
of foreign crude oil were
broken and supplies diverted
for sale on the world spot market
--the decrease in domestic crude
oil production is unexplained

0

United States 1979 crude oil stocks have
been increasing over year-end 1978 levels.
West Coast 1979 crude oil stocks have also
increased.

Measurement of crude oil supplies has three integral
components:

1)

3)

Crude oils from particular countries and regions

stocks.

foreign imports; 2)

2-1

domestic production; and

differ in specific gravity, metals content, and other qualitative aspects which are very significant to the purchaser.
These qualitative differences are not recorded in published
data, but must be kept in mind when discussing crude oil supplies.
Stocks include storage in refinery tanks, cargos in
tankers, ships, tank trucks, railroad tank cars and pipelines.
The level of stocks can fluctuate in relation to pending changes
in demand, seasons, crude oil prices, production estimates,
and political climates among other factors.

~conomic,

A.

Crude Oil Imports
Free world crude oil production is approximately 47

million b/d of which 63% is produced by countries belonging to
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

The

United States, which consumes 30% of world production, produces
8 - 9 million b/d and imports the remainder of its crude oil

1/

supplies.-

First quarter 1979 United States imports of foreign crude
oil averaged 6.2 million b/d.

America is dependent on OPEC

for the majority of this imported crude oil, and this reliance
has steadily increased since 1973.

In 1973, crude oil purchased

from OPEC comprised 71% of total United States foreign imports.
By 1978, this figure had increased to 82%.

The sources of im-

ported crude oil most important to the United States in 1978
were Saudi Arabia (15%), Nigeria (12%), and Venezuela (11%).
These supply arrangements are in contrast to those of 1973
when Venezuela was the largest United States supplier (27%),

2/
followed by Canada (20%) and Saudi Arabia (12%).-

2-2

Until December 1978, Iran was the second largest producer of crude oil in the world.

Iran provided 11% of the

United States foreign crude oil imports in 1978, 8% in 1977,

3/

and 7% in 1973.-

Although this reliance made the United States

very vulnerable to supply interruptions, other European and
Asian countries were even more dependent upon Iranian oil.
Japan, which imports virtually all of its crude oil, received

4/

17% of its 1977 crude oil imports from Iran.-

The revolution in Iran has had a significant effect
upon the world petroleum market.

Iranian oil production had

reached levels as high as six million b/d in early 1978, and
accounted for 13% of 1978 Free World oil production.

However,

by October 1978 the country's political instability began to
undermine its crude oil production.

Strikes and slowdowns by

oil field workers resulted in reduced production, and in late
December, Iranian exports ceased completely.

Production resumed

after 69 days, but only at a rate of 3.5 - 4 million b/d.
The full and continuing primary and secondary impacts
of the Iranian reduction and recent OPEC sanctions on United
States imports are not clear.

As has been widely reported in

the media, foreign crude oil imports into the United States,
excluding imports to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, have
declined since the curtailment of Iranian oil production in
December 1978 and this trend continued after the subsequent
resumption of limited production.

However, this decline during

the first five months of 1979 was from record-setting import
levels experienced during the last quarter of 1978.
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To put this

decrease in perspective:

in December, 1978, the United States

imported 6.7 million b/d, whereas by May 1979, this had dropped
by 800,000 b/d to 5.9 million b/d.

However, when the first six

months in 1979 are compared to the same period in 1978, crude

5/

oil imports actually increased 420,000 b/d or 7.3%.(See Graph 1)-
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A further aspect that clouds the crude oil imports
picture, and has nearly gone unreported, is the United States
government's continuing efforts to increase the volume of crude
oil in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR).

2-4

From December 1, 1978

through March 1979, the United States added approximately
22,685,000 million barrels of foreign imported crude oil to
6/
the SPR.This is considered more fully in the discussion
of crude oil stocks.
The net decrease in Iranian crude oil production has
had the effect of reorganizing the world crude oil market.

The

world market went from a condition of surplus to one of deficit,
forcing those countries which were especially dependent upon
Iranian crude oil to become intensively competitive in the world
crude oil market.

Before the revolution in Iran, much of the

world's crude oil production was under long-term contract.
Crude oil production in surplus to these contracts was sold on
what is called the "spot market".
The spot market has operated as a mechanism for producers to sell supplies in surplus of contractual obligations.
This market mechanism has long been used by the petroleum
industry as a price indicator.
tight, price escalates.

When crude oil supplies are

Inversely, when there is a surplus,

price decreases.
Since December, 1978, there has been a drastic rearrange-

I

ment in supplier-purchaser contractual relations.

With the

curtailment of Iranian exports, the spot market initially dried
up.

When the National Iranian Oil Company resumed production,

although at reduced levels, they began canceling old contracts
and allocating their production to the spot market.

Because

overall world supplies were tight, Iran was able to obtain
significantly-higher prices for its crude oil.
nations quickly followed suit.
2-5

Other producing

Purchasers with cancelled contracts came under extraordinary pressure to compete on the spot market for the newlyfreed crude oil supplies.

The economic success producers

experienced in resorting to the spot market encouraged further
reallocation, and thus traditional supplier-purchaser relations
have been upset and world crude oil production redistributed.
Countries bidding actively on the spot market have purchased
previously-contracted supplies, generating shortages elsewhere
while pushing up prices.

Japan has become an aggressive

purchaser and has been successful in obtaining supplies of
Indonesian crude oil.
B.

Domestic Production
Whereas some OPEC and other producing countries tern-

porarily increased production during the height of the Iranian
shutdown, United States production in the first six months of
1979 actually decreased.

In the first six months of 1978,

7/
domestic crude oil production averaged 8,643,000 b/d.-

By

comparison, in the first six months of 1979, preliminary
figures indicate the United States produced an average of

8/
8,436,000 b/d of crude oil.-

This 207,000 b/d average shortfall

is the equivalent to the loss of 37,467,000 barrels of crude
oil production.

(See Graph 2)
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This difference appears to be due to a steady decline

in domestic crude production during the fourth quarter of 1978
and the first quarter of 1979.

From October 1978 to March 1979,

9/
domestic crude production dropped 5%, or 461,000 b/d.-

By

comparison, the General Accounting Office estimated the United
10/
States crude shortfall due to Iran to be 500,000 b/d.-According to testimony presented to the Committee from
Chevron U.S.A., decreasing domestic production, on the order of
2% each year, must be expected as our oil fields become older

2-7

11/
and less productive.--

However, a substantive explanation

for the more pronounced decline noted above has not been
brought to light by the Committee's investigation.

This drop

in domestic crude oil production must be considered a significant
factor of the national condition of fuel scarcity.
Some attempts to explain this situation, offered in
the media, have included inclement weather and mechanical failures.
In testimony to the Committee, Chevron U.S.A. stated that domestic
production cannot be accelerated on short notice as was the production of other countries.

However, preliminary data from the

American Petroleum Institute indicates that following a marked
decline in domestic production between October 1978 and February
1979, production increased 249,000 b/d (3%) from March to April,
12/
and then decreased through May and June.
(See Graph 2) The
United States was the only other oil-producing country besides
Iran to show a crude production decrease in the first quarter

13/
of 1979.-C.

Crude Oil Stocks
Inventories of crude oil available to the refiners

are known as stocks.

In addition to crude oil at the refinery

and in terminal storage tanks, companies consider all crude oil
being transported in pipelines, tankers, rail tank cars, and
truck tank cars as stocks.

Many firms have predetermined volumes

called minimum operating levels (MOLs).

If stocks fall below

the MOL, refiners believe their operations may be subject to
interruptions by delivery delays, spot shortages, or other
similar events.

Such interruptions could in turn affect wholesale

and retail operations.
2-8

Crude oil stocks therefore have a critical role in
the operations of the petroleum market.

In analysis and

commentary on the current crisis, there has been a tendency
to make comparisons of United States stock levels as reported
in December 1978 and December 1977.

Such an analysis indicates

a 9% decline which, it has been suggested, left the United
14/
States unusually vulnerable.-However, such a comparison fails to take into account

•

the fact that stocks were abnormally high in late 1977 and
early 1978.

(See Graph 3)

continually increased J

Throughout 1977, crude oil stocks

as a substantial OPEC price increase had

been anticipated by year's end.

This price increase had not

materialized by early spring 1978, and so crude oil stocks declined throughout the balance of the year, resulting in the
above-mentioned lower levels in December 1978.
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Through the first part of 1979, a concerted effort
seems to have been made to increase crude oil stocks, while at
the same time a national crude oil shortage was being stressed.
(See Graph 3)

It appears that stocks were lower than normal

in the beginning of 1979 due to last year's draw down.

And

even with that draw down, crude stocks at the beginning of
1979 were higher than at the beginning of 1977 and 1976.

The

Committee is unable to ascertain if these additions to crude
oil stocks, above levels of prior years, during a time of product
scarcity, were necessary.
Since October 1977, the Department of Energy has been
adding crude oil to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR).

At

the end of 1978, the SPR stood at 66,860,000 bbl., and by March
1979 it had climbed to 82,501,000 bbl.

Measurements of crude

stocks, including the SPR, show the highest inventory levels
ever by the end of 1978.

(See Graph 4)

However, as the Depart-

ment of Energy had not installed pumping equipment, these crude
oil stocks could not be utilized during the peak of the crisis.
Most of the crude oil being used to create the SPR is
imported crude oil.

It is unclear how much of the fuel scarcity

condition may have been alleviated through temporarily redirecting these imports, but the refining and distribution of
this crude and additional industry crude directed to inventories
~I

would certainly have had a positive effect upon fuel availability.--
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The California and the PADD 5 Crude Oil Supply Perspective
California and United States supply trends have not

followed the same course in recent years.

The United States

is divided into five Petroleum Administration Defense Districts
(PADDs).

(See Figure 1)

These districts are drawn on a geo-

graphical basis and California is contained within PADD 5.

In

addition to California, PADD 5 includes the states of Alaska,
Washington, Oregon, Nevada, Arizona, and Hawaii.
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The geological separation by the Rockies of PADD 5
from the rest of the United States is more than a convenient
demarcation.

Very little in the way of crude oil flows over

the Rockies either into or out of PADD 5 by railcar, truck or
pipeline.
Due to this physical separation, California - PADD 5
supply trends have not followed the same course as those of
United States in recent years.

Until mid-summer 1977, and the

arrival 1 of Alaskan North Slope crude oil, the West Coast was
heavily dependent on foreign imports, California production and
small amounts of Southern Alaskan production.
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In December 1976, California total crude oil receipts
averaged 1,834,000 b/d.

Of the total, domestic crude oil

receipts averaged 980,870 b/d or 53%, while foreign imports,
primarily receipts from Indonesia and the Middle East, averaged
853,452 b/d or 47%.

However, this trend has changed significantly

in the last two years.

By December 1978, domestic receipts,

including 581,032 b/d of Alaskan North Slope crude oil, had

•

grown to comprise 80% of total receipts, averaging 1,442,000 b/d,
while foreign receipts dipped to only 20% of the 1,805,000 b/d
16/
total, averaging 363,000 b/d.-In contrast to the nation as
a whole, California and PADD 5 are now dependent on domestic
production for the majority of their crude supplies.

(See Graph 5)
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In light of the transition from light imports to heavy
domestic crude oils in 1977, the Iranian revolution appears to
have had a minimal direct effect upon California receipts of
crude oil.

Since November 1977, this state has not received

any Iranian oil, and Indonesia has been our primary source of
imported foreign crude oil.

(See Graph 6)

Although imports

from Indonesia declined in the first quarter of 1979, this
decrease in volume was more than offset by increased imports of
Saudi Arabian crude.

As a result, total receipts of foreign

crude in California for the first quarter of 1979 actually in17/
creased by 19,000 b/d over fourth quarter 1978 levels.-This
trend is in marked contrast to the national decline of imports.
These figures indicate th?t, at

l·~ast

for the first

quarter of 1979, there was not a crude oil shortage in California
due to a decrease of foreign imports.

Overall in California,

from September 1978 through the first quarter of 1979, total
crude oil receipts were relatively constant.

(See Graph 7)

Crude oil stocks in California and PADD 5 have followed
national trends more closely than have crude oil imports.
California

crude oil stocks rose through 1977, followed by a

draw down in 1978.
PADD 5 figures.

(See Graph 8)

(See Graph 9)

This trend is also seen in

As of June 1979, preliminary

data indicates that PADD 5 crude oil stocks were very close to
1978 levels.

California refinery crude oil stocks hit a low

point in February 1979 and increased through March.
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E.

Summary
Preliminary analysis of data indicates the Iranian

shortfall, and subsequent rearrangement of world crude oil
supplier-purchaser relationships, did not reduce California
crude oil supplies through the first quarter of 1979.

Foreign

imports of crude oil into California were up slightly while
domestic receipts of crude oil were down.
Iran and the United States were the only oil-producing
nations to show a decrease in crude oil production in the first
part of 1979.

The reasons for the decline in United States

crude oil production are not clear.
California crude oil stocks dipped to low levels in
February 1979 and showed signs of being rebuilt in March of 1979.
Preliminary data indicates that June 1979 West Coast crude oil
stocks were at approximately the same levels as 1978.

Nationally,

crude oil stocks have been increasing through the first six
months of 1979.

2-17

III.

•

I

REFINING

o

Refining of heavy crude oil requires
special refining components.
The
utilization rates of such equipment
are not published and therefore the
efficiency of these units cannot be
assessed with available data.

0

California refineries have been processing heavy domestic crude oil for
many years and large volumes of Alaskan
North Slope crude oil since 1977.

o

Although there are complaints about
government regulations interfering
with refinery expansions and modifications to be able to process heavy
crude oil, there have been permits
issued and projects initiated for
such work.
It is unclear to what extent government policies are inhibiting
additional refinery retrofits or if other
economic and strategic reasons are
responsible.

o

California gasoline production dropped
21% between December 1978 and March
1979, while residual fuel oil production increased. There is no
thorough explanation for this shift
in refined product outputs.

0

While industry gasoline stocks were
drawn down substantially in the first
quarter of 1979, it does not appear
they were at minimum levels. Gasoline
stock levels in PADD 5 did not drop
below 1978 levels.

3-1

The adequacy of California's refinery capacity has
emerged as the area of greatest uncertainty in the Committee's
hearings and staff investigation to date.

The Committee sought

answers to the following questions:
1)

Are the types and capacities of
California's refineries adequate
to meet demand?

2)

Are existing California refineries
being utilized to the fullest extent
possible?

3)

To what extent are California refineries equipped to process crude
oils available now and likely to
be in the future?

There are 40 crude oil refineries in California with
a reported capacity of 2,400,000 b/d.

Eight of the largest

oil companies in the state have 12 refineries with 1,751,000 b/d
18/
capacity or 73% of California's total refinery capacity.-These large refineries produce the majority of the state's
gasoline.
The isolation of PADD 5, described in the above discussion of crude oil supplies, is particularly relevant in
understanding the California - PADD 5 refinery picture.
California refining capacity makes up 80% of the total PADD 5

19/
refining capacity.-A.

The Refining Process
Each refinery is unique and varies in its ability to

refine different types of "feedstocks" (inputs), to produce
specific "product slates" (outputs), and in maintenance requirements.

Utilization of refineries is therefore a function

of many variables including among others the complexity of
the refinery, products desired, types and quality of crude oil

3-2

refined, and operable condition of refinery equipment.
Capacity ratings reported to government regulatory
agencies involve the "upstream" capacity, which is the amount
of crude oil fed into the refinery's primary distillation unit(s)
at the beginning of the refining process.

Upstream refining is

the initial distillation of crude oil whereby it is separated
into its natural components.
Often unmentioned in discussion of refinery capabilities
is the capacity of the refinery's "downstream" equipment.

Such

equipment includes cokers, catalytic reformers, and catalytic
hydrocrackers.

For California, these operations involve the

most important aspects of refining operations:

the second-stage

of the refinery process which upgrades distillates into products which meet set specifications, produces more gasoline
from lower-grade distillates, and radically alters residual
product from the primary distillation process into middle
distillates and light products.
Downstream equipment is not totally reliant on the
upstream refining capabilities at a given refinery.

Distillates

can be purchased on the open market, and processed in downstream
equipment independent of upstream refinery apparatus.

Testi-

mony received by the Committee indicates that the downstream
capacity of many California refineries have not been designed
to receive and process the full volume of output from the initial
distillation units.
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B.

Utilization Rates
Utilization rates usually refer to the amount of crude

processed by a refinery's upstream components and is expressed
as a percentage of the "name-plate" or maximum potential.
Industry witnesses indicated that a utilization rate of 95%
name-plate capacity represents maximum use of a refinery.
American Petroleum Institute statistics indicate that since
1976, the highest single utilization of operable upstream
refinery capacity for the United States in any given month was
92.7%.

In 1976, the United States' percentage of operable

capacity utilized was 89%, in 1977 - 89.9%, and in 1978 it
20/

dropped to an average of 88%.--

For the first six months of

21/
this year, United States refinery utilization averaged 84.6%.--

COMMITTEE ON FUEL SCARCITY
US CRUDE REFINING CAPACITY UTILIZATION~ JAN '77 THRU JUN '79

(See Graph 10)
100

90

('
-

p
E
R

~
-

-

..........
;;::"...... .._

/

-

..:. .. .,J....•_.. .-; .......... :....: •

/

*/ .........

.

- --

--...,....,..,"

-

-~

...

-

I
NOV

I

80

c

E
N
T

70

60

50

I
JAN

I

I

MAR

I

I
HAY

I

I
JUL

I

FEB
APR
JUN
AUG
1977<DOE)
t978<DOE) SOURCE: DOE & API <PR-8/3)
1979<API)
GRAPH 10
3-4

I
SEP

I

OCT

DEC

PADD 5 data from the American Petroleum Institute
indicate a decline in refinery utilization in the second quarter
of 1979.

The average utilization rates reported for April were

84%, 81% in May, 82.9% in June, and 85.4% as of the first week
22/
in July.-By contrast, other PAD Districts reported higher
utilization rates.

The West Coast refining sector is therefore

operating at 15-20% below its rated upstream name-plate capacity.
Whereas the American Petroleum Institute and Federal
Department of Energy collect information on percent utilization
of capacity, completely unreported is the utilization of downstream refinery units.

This secondary refinery capability is

the essential element in the refining of heavier crude oils
(Alaskan and California crude oil) into desirable light products.
In testimony to the Committee, it was reported that
downstream capacity is being utilized at rates which in some
cases exceed 110% of normal capacity.

This is possible as normal

capacity is not necessarily equal to maximum capacity.

Even

though upstream refining capacity may not be totally utilized,
the volume of unfinished products produced by initial distillation which needs additional refining may well exceed downstream
capacity.

As mentioned above, these secondary processing units

can also process middle distillates and residual oil obtained
from other sources.
The depth and complexity of refinery operations makes
an assessment of utilization rates and efficiency of operations
very difficult.

This is especially true when attempting to
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assess if the refining industry is fully utilizing available
downstream equipment.

Operation of refinery components are

varJcd by the industry t<> produce a particular product slate.
Variations in product output observed in California in the
first quarter of 1979 indicate that changes in utilization are
occurring.

However, the lack of reported information concerning

downstream equipment leaves many questions unanswered.
C.

Feedstocks (Crude Input to Refineries)
The issue of quality differences between types of

crude oils has been pointed to as a factor affecting product
output.

Feedstock quality,

and operating efficiency,

in addition to refinery hardware

is an essential factor influencing

refinery product slates, and was repeatedly emphasized by many
of the Committee's witnesses.
Basically, crude oil is a mixture of hydrocarbon
molecules.

Impurities such as metalics, sulfur and parafin,

which are often associated with crude oil deposits, make each
type of crude oil unique.

All of these factors are closely

considered when refineries are initially designed or later
modified.

Refiners are thus anxious to obtain crude feedstocks

which complement their refinery design and thus permit maximum
efficiency of operations.

The limits to which refineries can pro-

cess crude oils they were not designed for varies on a
facility-by-facility basis.

3-6

In general terms, California has had two types of
crude oil available to it:

A)

light (high specific gravity)

crude oil such as most Saudi Arabian and Indonesian crudes which
are conducive to less complex refining processes; and B)

heavy

(low specific gravity) crude oil such as most Californian and
Alaskan North Slope crude oils which require more complex

down~

stream refining processes including reforming, coking, and
catalytic cracking.

Simple distillation of a barrel of light

Indonesian crude oil gives substantially more light product than
a barrel of heavier Alaskan North Slope crude oil.

This basic

difference represents how critical crude quality is in the
refining process.
By late 1976, the mix of California's refinery feedstocks averaged approximately 50% domestic crude oil and 50%
foreign crude oil.

However, with the arrival of Alaskan North

Slope crude oil into California in April of 1977, foreign crudes
(specifically Saudi Arabian) came to represent a smaller fraction
of refinery feedstocks.

(See Graph 11)

California refineries

began utilizing large quantities of heavy domestic crude in 1977
and recent changes in crude oil inputs have been comparatively minor.
The flexibility of individual California refineries to
process different mixes of crude oil has been represented to be
quite small.

Alarmingly, the Committee has received testimony

that California refineries have been designed to operate utilizing
lighter crude oils heretofore obtained from foreign sources, and
have difficulty in refining the larger proportions of heavy crude
oils now available from California and Alaska.
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Given recent developments on the world crude oil
market, it appears that refinery feedstocks in California will
never again have a high percentage of light foreign crudes due
to the keen competition for light foreign crude oils on the
world market and America's desire to stimulate domestic oil
production.

This means that California refiners will be forced

to meet future demand with relatively heavy crude oil feedstocks.
This transition, it is said, will have to entail the modification
and expansion of downstream refinery capabilities in PADD 5 to
allow for efficient utilization of heavy crude oil supplies.
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Complicating this entire refinery issue still further
is the growing demand for unleaded gasoline.

Each year the

automobile fleet is requiring more unleaded gasoline as new
cars replace older vehicles which used leaded gasoline.

Pro-

duction of unleaded gasoline adds pressure upon already-strained
refinery capacity.

It takes more refining time and therefore

more capacity to produce a given amount of unleaded as opposed
to leaded gasoline.

•

Demand for unleaded fuel is anticipated to

peak in the mid 1980's when the federal mileage standards are
met.
In testimony to the Committee, the industry made re-

•

peated statements that environmental regulations and Department
of Energy pricing regulations have inhibited their investments
in the highly-technical and expensive downstream refining equipment that would allow them to better utilize heavy domestic
crude oil.
However, there have been

m~ny

applications and approvals

for additions to California's refinery inventory both in terms
of refining modifications and construction of new refineries.
At least nine refinery expansions and four new refineries have
been approved in the last two years.
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(See Figure 2)

FIGURE 2
APPROVED REFINERY MODIFICATIONS/EXPANSIONS
IN CALIFORNIA (77/78)
Refinery
Location

From
(B/CD)

To
(B/CD)

ARCO

Carson

180,000

180,000

Beacon Oil Co.

Hanford

12,300

14,000

1,700

Champlin Petroleum

Wilmington

30,600

50,000

19,400

Fletcher Oil and
Refining

Carson

20,000

30,000

10,000

Kern County
Refinery

Bakersfield

15,900

28,000

12,100

Mohawk Petroleum

Bakersfield

22,100

33,000

10,900

Newhall Refining

Newhall

11,500

17,500

6,000

uco

Martinez

-0-

10,000

10,000

Gibson

Bakersfield

-0-

5,000

5,000

USA Petroleum

Ventura

30,000

11,000

Progress Refinery

Kern

5,000

5,000

Golden Eagle
Refining

Carson

41,000

24,500

Coastal

Kern

10,000

10,000

TOTAL:

125,600

Company

19,000
-0-

16,500
-0-

Increased
Capacity B/CD
-0-

(5% increase in state capacity)
B/CD

=

SOURCE:

Barrels per calendar day
The Oil and Gas Journal - March 20, 1978 and
California Air Resources Board, Authority to
Construct Applications
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The statement that government red tape is inhibiting
investments in refinery capacity to handle heavy crude oil is
also confusing in light of existing refinery operations.

Texaco

indicated in their testimony to the Committee that their Wilmington
refinery "basically runs on heavy sour crudes".

Similarly,

Exxon testified that their Benicia refinery operated entirely
on Alaskan North Slope crude oil.

Several other companies

indicated they had either just completed or were currently con23/
templating refinery modifications.
D.

Refined Petroleum Product Output
Production of refined petroleum products is a very

complicated and flexible procedure involving variation of certain
parameters according to the dictates of engineering and business.
The parameters include such factors as crude feedstocks, refinery
capabilities, and storage capacity.

Engineering concerns involve

repairs and maintenance of equipment, and the technical operations
of refineries.

Business concerns involve adjusting product slates

to meet changing market strategies, scheduling "down time",
setting product inventories and rates of production for various
products.
The Committee staff has focused upon trends in production rates, product inventories, and refinery down time to
highlight factors in production that have contributed to fuel
scarcity in California.
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The most alarming trend is that gasoline production in
PADD 5 and California was severely depressed during the first
months of 1979.

(See Graphs 12 and 13)

Gasoline production

in California dropped 21% (199,935 b/d) from December 1978 to
24/
March 1979, from 958,096 b/d to 758,161 b/d.-This drop seems
unexplainable in the face of crude supplies and market conditions.
California data for periods beyond the first quarter 1979 is
not available to determine if this trend has continued.
However, preliminary data for the second quarter of
1979 from the American Petroleum Institute for PADD 5 indicates
that while production increased slightly in the second quarter
of 1979,it was still below December 1978 levels.

In the first

two weeks of July 1979, gasoline production in PADD 5 was up
to 1,090,000

b/d~

but this figure was still 6% below the
25/
1,163,000 b/d produced in December 1978.-It is interesting to note that the depression in
gasoline output has been accompanied by an increase in residual
fuel oil production.

(See Graphs 13 and 14)

In March 1979,

residual fuel oil production in California was at an all-time
26/
high of 516,290 b/d.-A similar increase is seen in PADD 5
residual fuel oil production, as preliminary statistics show
a 31% rise from early February to late March (487,000 b/d to
639,000 b/d).

During the second quarter, the PADD 5 data

indicate that residual fuel oil production dropped back to lower
levels.
27/
bjd.--

By May residual fuel oil production averaged 470,000
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As was mentioned above, a complex array of factors
determines what production from refineries will be during any
given time period.

Whatever the reason, the trends discussed

above indicate that at the time when it would be expected that
refineries would be producing more gasoline to ease the fuel
scarcity in California, just the opposite was occurring.
One particular factor which may account for some of
this shift in products is the number of refinery shutdowns for
maintenance and emergency repairs.

Witnesses from major oil

companies testified that many of the region's larger refineries
have been partially or totally out of service during

~-14

portions of the first five months of 1979.
finery down time is attributable to

11

Much of this re-

turnarounds",

i.e., in-

stallation of new equipment and routine maintenance.
Due to the significant proportion of total California
capacity that major refineries represent, down time at any one
refinery can have a significant impact on refined product
availability.

•

This is especially true for gasoline, as gasoline

capacity in California is primarily concentrated in relatively
few large refineries.

The trends in production discussed above

may have been in part the result of down time at certain refineries.

For example, Chevron's catalytic cracker at Richmond

was shut down from February 16 through April 23, cutting gasoline
28/
production by some 28,000 b/d.-Other shut downs have occurred
29/

elsewhere in the state and in PADD 5.-The frequency and timing of company "turnarounds 11 has
been questioned.

In interviews between Committee staff and the

Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union, the beliefs of experienced refinery workers were conveyed to the Committee staff
that refinery down time was becoming increasingly more frequent
than in previous years.

They maintain companies appear to have

stepped up the frequency and thoroughness of their maintenance
programs in what the Union believes is marked contrast to past
practices of utilizing refineries and their equipment for much
longer time periods between repairs.
The implication of this discussion to the fuel scarcity
situation is obvious.

The statements made by the Oil, Chemical

and Atomic Workers Union have been disputed by industry officials.
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Testimony before the Committee by company representatives indicated that additional shutdowns had been planned for the spring
of 1979 and were intentionally postponed to continue producing
gasoline without interruptions.

These witnesses stated that

these actions had been taken in an effort to avoid additional
gasoline shortages due to routine maintenance.
It was suggested to the Committee that another reason
for the shift in products may have been increased demand for
heating oil due to the long winter.

Such a market situation

would cause refiners to shift product slates to produce heavier
products (heating oils) at the expense of lighter products (gasoline).

The contribution to such a program that would be required

of West Coast refineries, however, is unclear.

In testimony

before the Committee, Mr. Douglas Robinson, Deputy Administrator,
Economic Regulatory Administration of the Department of Energy,
indicated that the federal government was not looking to PADD 5
refineries for assistance in this year's effort to build up
heating oil stocks f6r next winter.
In addition to trends in production and refinery down
time, some interesting trends can be observed in gasoline inventory levels.

As mentioned earlier, product inventories are

an integral part of understanding how the industry adjusts production.
Nationally, gasoline stocks were at a very high level
in 1977, and a substantial draw down occurred in 1978.
Graph 15)

(See

This is similar to the trends observed in crude stocks.

~-1R

PADD 5 and California gasoline stocks were drawn down throughout 1977.

However, stocks began to climb again in late 1978

and continued to do so until early 1979.

(See Graphs 16 and 17)
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GAS STOCKS

In 1979, gasoline inventories have shown a marked
decrease in PADD 5.

Stocks dropped from 30,693,000 barrels

in late January to 24,257,000 barrels by late April, a drop of
30/
21%.-However, this trend was not as pronounced in California
through March.

(See Graph 17)

As was mentioned in the discussion of crude stocks,
companies have minimum operating levels (MOLs) below which stocks
are not drawn down to insure continuous operation of facilities .

•

This is also true for product inventories, and according to
the American Petroleum Institute, approximately 35% of the
industry's total inventories of gasoline are thereby rendered
31/
unavailable.-It is not clear at this time if the draw down of
gasoline inventories observed in PADD 5 in the beginning of
1979 represents a drop approaching MOL.

This seems highly un-

likely, as even with the draw down, stocks never dropped below
their 1978 levels.

(See Graph 16)

Information supplied to the

Committee by Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) indicates that
ARCO reached MOL for gasoline in early May 1979.

•

Similar data

from other major companies, though promised to Committee by
the Company's Sacramento representative, has not been forthcoming.
American Petroleum Institute preliminary data seems to indicate
on a national and regional level that gasoline stocks have not
been utilized on an industry-wide basis to MOLs (the greatest
~I

extent possible) in 1979.--

Draw down to MOLs would have

certainly resulted in increased fuel availability.
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E.

Summary
The issue of refinery capability and utilization has

emerged as the least certain aspect of the Committee investigation.

Utilization rates of upstream components are low on

the West Coast, which may be due to reliance upon heavy domestic
crude oils.

Utilization rates of downstream equipment are not

available, and it is thus difficult to assess how efficiently
heavy crude oil is being refined in California.
Industry spokesmen have indicated refinery expansions
and modifications to allow for more efficient utilization of
heavy crude oil have been inhibited by government regulations.
While this may be true, empirical evidence, including large
volumes of heavy crude oil currently being refined in California
refineries and numerous applications for refinery modifications
and expansions, raises questions concerning this assertion.

A

better understanding of other economic and strategic factors
that may be involved in such investment decisions is necessary.
These issues will undoubtedly play an important part in
California's energy future.
Decreased gasoline production by California refineries
in the beginning of 1979 must have contributed to the gasoline
crisis.

The reason for this decline is unclear, but refinery

down time and record levels of residual fuel oil production
on the West Coast in the spring of 1979 may have contributed to
this situation.

Cautious distribution of gasoline inventories

may have also contributed to the fuel scarcity.
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It is incumbent on the Legislature to determine the
degree to which environmental and price control regulations are
factors which inhibit investment in modification and expansion
of California refineries, or whether there are other stronger
influences such as corporate marketing strategies, tax provisions, economic or strategic factors which are influencing
the decision not to invest in California refinery capacity.
This issue is of particular importance to California's
energy future and to the Legislature as it is a long-term
problem which must be understood and solved soon if we are to
utilize our petroleum resources efficiently in the future.
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IV.

DEMAND FOR GASOLINE

0

"Conspicuous consumption" by Californians
does not appear to be "the" cause of fuel
scarcity.

0

Figures on increased gasoline demand in
1979, while high in January and February,
dropped significantly in March and April.
May 1979 demand measurements were below
1978 levels.

0

Significant increases in industrial gasoline purchases early in the year appear
to have made a substantial contribution
to the shortfall for private consumers in
May.

0

Economic growth, population growth, and
increases in the number of registered
vehicles and outstanding drivers' licenses
have contributed to increased gasoline
demand in California.

0

Increased gasoline exports to other western
states and decreased imports of gasoline
from the Gulf Coast and the North West
appear to have made a major contribution
to the fuel scarcity situation .

•
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The third area the Committee staff has explored is
that of demand for refined petroleum products.

In the round

of accusations of "who" is responsible for the current shortage,
the finger has been pointed at the California motorist.

Offi-

cials of the federal government and industry have inferred that
Californians brought the fuel crunch upon themselves through
excessive consumption.
In testimony, the Committee was told by major oil
company witnesses that demand for gasoline by consumers had
increased drastically, making it difficult for the industry to
keep pace.

These witnesses expressed the belief that the tight

world market for crude oil in 1979, combined with heavy demand
for refined products, were the largest contributing factors to
the fuel scarcity.
A.

Distribution as Measurement of Demand
So-called "demand" is not measured by the amount of

fuel consumed by the end user, i.e., the motorist.

Instead,

distribution of petroleum products from the primary storage
of refiners to the next level in the distribution chain is
recorded as the indicator of demand.

Therefore, demand figures

are not measures of actual consumption by end users, but indicate only how much of a given product has been distributed.
Since complete statistics on petroleum products are not kept or
required by government agencies once they leave the refinery,
little is known of the size of the inventory that may be contained
in pipelines, tankers, distribution storage tanks, tank cars,
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tank trucks, service station tanks, and other bulk storage
facilities.
Keeping in mind that demand measurements are only the
distribution of products, examination of gasoline distribution
data compiled by the State Board of Equalization indicate that
in January and February, 1979,

distribut~ons

than for the same period last year.

were 7.6% higher

However, in March and

April, 1979, distributions leveled off and were only .45% above
last year's levels.

In May, distributions were 2.8% less than

1978 levels (due in part to the federal allocation program).
(See Figure 3)

With the uncertain storage capacity in the

distribution system mentioned above, it is possible that end
gasoline consumption, by California motorists, might not have
increased at anywhere near the rates publicized in January
and February.
FIGURE 3
Gasoline Distributions:

1979

Millions of Gallons
Percent change from
same monthz 1978

1979

1978

January

965.2

907.9

6.3

February

941.8

863.7

9.0

March

1,004.8

999.1

0.6

April

962.0

959.5

0.3

May

998.4

1,027.3

(2.8)

4,872.2

4,757.5

2.4

Five months
SOURCE:

State of California, Board of Equalization
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B.

Factors Affecting Demand
Demand for gasoline, while increasing throughout the

nation in the past few years, has been climbing in our State at
a rate above the national average.

However, direct comparisons

of demand levels between states is misleading, given the strong
correlation between gasoline consumption and economic activity.
California's economic growth has meant that individuals and
businesses have purchased more vehicles and taken more trips
for work and pleasure.
Wage and salary employment in California were up 7.3%
in 1978, compared to a 4.3% nationwide increase.

Similarly,

personal income in the state rose 13.9% last year, while
33/
nationally it increased only 11.7%.-In addition to this increase in economic growth,
California demographics show two unique features that have
not been examined in the round of accusations.

Total popu-

lation in California increased 1.9% from July 1, 1977 to July 1,
1978, while the national increase was only 0.8% over the same
34/
time period.-Moreover, the number of outstanding drivers'
licenses in California increased by 2.9% in 1978, a rate of
35/

growth faster than the growth in population.--

Such demo-

graphic trends may have a significant impact on gasoline usage.
And yet, Californians use fewer gallons per vehicle
than the average American motorist.

California was also below

the national average for gallons consumed per capita in 1976
and 1977 and 37th among states in monthly per-vehicle gasoline
36/
consumption (63 gallons).-The only West Coast states with
.. 37/
lower per-vehicle consumption rates are Colorado and Hawa11.
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C.

Stockpiling
In the first few weeks of the gas crisis there is no

doubt that California consumers intensified their own problem
by "tank topping".

Industry officials have pointed out that

the average size of credit card purchases decreased as consumers
insured their tanks were full.

There were numerous reports of

individuals storing large quantities of gasoline for private use.

•

There is no way to determine how much of the demand for gasoline
in California during this time period was the result of such
panic buying.
However, motorists were not the only sector guilty of
so-called "tank topping".

It is likely that every link in the

distribution system (pipeline companies, wholesalers, jobbers retail outlets) accelerated their purchases.

It was particularly

evident that industrialjcommerical demand for gasoline increased long before consumers began to worry about fuel scarcity.
Mr. Frank P. Alcock, past President of the Purchasing
Management Association of Los Angeles (a commercial buyers'
organization), informed the Committee that a "commodity alert"
was issued to members of the Association in late 1978.

This

alert, a verbal notification, informed members of possible
shortages in fuels and petrochemical supplies.
The Los Angeles Times reported that many businesses
with large vehicle fleets which need gasoline began increasing
stocks as early as late 1978 at the first signs of trouble in
Iran.
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According to the Times,
In the first four months of (1979),
jobbers and refiners who buy from
Shell and sell to commercial accounts
generated 74% increased demand in
Southern California and a 55% jump
in the San Francisco area over the
38/
same period last year.
The article also discussed similar trends for other major suppliers.
While such a prudent business practice is understandable,
this source of demand seems to have been overlooked in many analyses
of the fuel scarcity situation.

However, due to a lack of recorded

data concerning gasoline storage beyond the refinery gate, the
contribution of accelerated business purchases to the overall
shortage cannot be accurately assessed.

And yet, the sporadic

increases in distribution in January and February can be attributed, at least in part, to precautionary industrial/commercial
purchases.

In the same Los Angeles Times article, a Chevron

executive said that his company could have had a 95-100% allocation
in May 1979 without the increase in industrial demand during the
39/
first part of the year.-D.

In,terst'}te Imports and Exports of Gasoline
Still another critical element affecting overall

California supplies of refined products is the role California
refineries play in meeting the demand of other western states
for refined products.
Although California must import gasoline to meet its
own needs,

it is a net exporter of gasoline.

4-6

(See Graphs 18 and 19)
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In the first quarter of 1979, imports declined while the rate
of exports increased.

California exported 21,144 b/d more

gasoline in the first quarter of 1979 than in the same period in
1978.

However, gasoline imports were 4,188 b/d less than the

1978 rate.

When combined, these changes result in a net decrease

of 25,332 bbl/day of gasoline in California during the first
40/
quarter of 1979 when compared to the same time period last year.-In testimony to the Committee, Mr. Douglas Robinson,
of the Department of Energy, stated that this figure could be as
high as 80,000 b/d.

The majority of these imports are from the

Gulf Coast, and it has been suggested to the Committee that this
area was more severely effected by the national drop in foreign
imports of crude oil.

With less crude available on the Gulf

Coast, less gasoline would be available for
41/
Coast.
E.

~xport

to the West

Transportation Patterns
Short fuel supplies, long service station lines, and

high prices have had a great influence on transportation patterns.
There have been increases reported in carpooling (15% since
April), bus use (14% over pre-shortage levels), and commuter
42/
train patronage.-CalTrans reports decreases in peak commuter
hour freeway driving in Southern California.
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According to CalTrans, freeway traffic flow in Los
Angeles began to gradually decline in early April with significant reduction being reported by the first week of May.

Un-

fortunately, drivers have begun to resume their former habits.
CalTrans reports that average daily traffic had been reduced as
much as 14% during the week of May 7-11 (odd-even was instituted
May 9th) and was still 2% lower during the week of June 18-22 .

•
PERCENTAGE WEEKLY CHANGES IN
AVERAGE DAILY TRAFFIC ON
THE 42 MILE DOWNTOWN LOS ANGELES FREEWAY LOOP
WEEK

April

•

2
9
16
23
30

DIFFERENCE

- 6
- 13
- 20

-0-0-2
-3
-5

- 27
May 4

-

May

7 - 11
14 - 18
21 - 25
28 - June 1

-14
-13
-10
-10

June

4 - 8
11 - 15
18 - 22

-5
-2
-2

SOURCE:

Cal Trans, Office of Traffic
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F.

Summary
Excessive demand for refined petroleum products by

Californ:\a motorists does not appear to have been "the" cause
of the gasoline crisis.

While in January and February 1979

demand for gasoline (which is a measure of distributions by
refineries, not consumption by end users) was up significantly
over last year's levels, by March and April it was back to only
slightly above 1978 figures.

In May 1979, gasoline demand was

actually lower than last year.

Economic growth and increases

larger than the national average in the number of registered
vehicles, population, and outstanding drivers' licenses,
indicate that accelerated demand for gasoline in this state
should be expected, and is not "conspicuous consumption".
While the long lines at the pumps may have been due
in part to tank topping by consumers, the level of gasoline
purchases by industrial users early in the year undoubtedly
were significant contributors to the severe fuel scarcity
situation in May.

Moreover, California is the major gasoline

supplier for much of PADD 5, and an increased level of gasoline
exports, combined with reduced imports, further exacerbated
the scarcity situation.

To simply point a finger at the

California public, as did many federal and industry officials,
is not a valid explanation for the fuel scarcity in California.
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APPENDIX A
SOURCES OF INFOHMATION
The Committee has obtained its information through
testimony provided at six Committee hearings, and limited data
obtained from the American Petroleum Institute, the federal
Department of Energy, and the California Energy Commission.
There are significant limitations to the data the
Committee has obtained from these sources.

Information supplied

to the Committee by the state Energy Commission on a statewide
basis

is unavailable after the first quarter of 1979.

State

statute requires companies to report data to the Commission once
a quarter, and there is a time lag between the closing of the
reporting period and the compilation of the data by the Commission.
United States Department of Energy data, available only
through March 1979, is published on a national and regional
basis.

Although data is reported to the Department of Energy

on a company-by-company and statewide basis, it is considered
proprietary and has been denied to the Committee.

Committee

staff are continuing their efforts to obtain this data .

•

The American Petroleum Institute (API), an industry
trade association,

is the only available data source updated

on a regular and timely basis through weekly and monthly publications.

API cautions that its data is preliminary and it

defers to Department of Energy (DOE) statistics whenever possible.
DOE data has thus been utilized in this report whenever possible.
In addition to data collection and analysis, the
Committee staff has interviewed representatives of the Department
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of Energy, the State Energy Commission, Department of Finance,
refiners, labor unions involved in the petroleum industry,
wholesalers and marketers of both crude oil and refined petroleum
products, other petroleum industry analysts, congressional
staffs, United States and State Department of Justice investigators, refinery engineers, and research consultants throughout
the country.

APPENDIX B
EXPLANATION OF GRAPHICS
Graphs utilized in this report were prepared using
Tektronix computer equipment at the Senate Office of Research.
The date of preparation is included on each graph (PR-date).
The sources of data utilized in preparation of each
graph are as follows:

•

Graphs 1, 2, and 3:

Department of Energy (DOE),

Monthly Energy Review, June, 1979, and American Petroleum Institute (API), Monthly Statistical Bulletins, April-June, 1979.
Graphs 4, 15:

DOE, Monthly Petroleum Statements,

1975 - 1978.
Graphs 5, 6, and 7:

California Energy Commission (CEC),

Quarterly Fuels and Energy Summary (QFES), Origin of Crude
Oil Receipts Report (Form OR-02).

The figures for domestic

receipts in Graph 5 represent the sum of Interstate and Intrastate receipts of crude oil from form OR-02.
Graph 8:

CEC, QFES, Refinery Stocks Report (Form OR-06)

and Oil Production Report (OP-01).

•

Crude stocks data represents

the sum of crude oil stocks from form OR-06, and crude stocks
on lease, in pipelines, and at tank farms from form OP-01.
Graphs 9, 12, 14 and 16:

DOE, Monthly Petroleum

Statements, 1977 - 1978, and API, Weekly Statistical Bulletins,
1979.

Note that the line labeled "1979" on these four graphs

represents weekly data and the monthly demarcations on the
horizontal axis are therefore approximate references to the

5-3

corresponding month on the "1979" line.

While the use of

weekly data unfortunately results in the greater variations
observed in the "1979" line, this was necessary as API weekly
statistics are the only recent data available for PADD 5.

The

lines labeled "1977" and "1978" represent official DOE statistics.
Graph 11:

CEC, QFES, Feedstock Report (Form OR-01).

Graph 13:

CEC, QFES, Refinery Output Report (Form

OR-04).
Graphs 17, 18, and 19:
Supply and Distribution Report,

CEC, QFES, Finished Product
(Form OM-01).

Gas stocks

data represents the sum of the beginning storage statistics
for premium, regular, low lead/unleaded, and unspecified gasoline.
Gas Imports data represents the sum of the above categories
for interstate receipts and foreign import receipts.

Gas export

data represents the sum of the above categories for interstate
sales and foreign sales.
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